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SARA B. THOMAS
State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #5867
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #9525
P.O. Box 2816
Boise, ID 83701
(208) 334-2712
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
KENNETH S. DICK,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
________________________________ )

NO. 43667
ADA COUNTY NO. CR 2014-5888
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
In his opening brief, Kenneth S. Dick argued the district court abused its
discretion when it denied his motion pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (“Rule 35”) for a
reduction of sentence. The district court denied Mr. Dick’s Rule 35 motion because it
concluded that “the facts alleged by [Mr. Dick] do not justify or provide new information
to the crime to which he pled guilty” and are thus “immaterial to the sentence imposed.”
(R., pp.109-10.) However, at sentencing, the district court stated the fact that Mr. Dick
was arrested prior to sentencing “cost him dearly.” (Tr., p.26, Ls.11-12.) The district
court also stated that when he received the reports about Mr. Dick’s recent arrest, “my
first thought was I’m going to impose ten years fixed” which “would be well within my
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rights . . . .” (Tr., p.28, Ls.3-8.) In its brief, the State argues first that Mr. Dick did not
present any new information in support of his Rule 35 motion, and second that Mr. Dick
cannot establish an abuse of discretion. The State is wrong in both respects and this
Court should vacate the district court’s order denying Mr. Dick’s Rule 35 motion and
remand with instructions to retain jurisdiction, as per the parties’ original plea
agreement. (R., p.66; Tr., p.6, L.24 – p.7, L.7.)
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Dick strongly disputes the State’s characterization of his offense. The State
describes the offense on the first two pages of its brief, citing to page three of the
Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI”). Page three of the PSI recounts the victim’s
statements to the police the day after the incident took place. (Resp. Br., pp.1-2; PSI,
p.3.) The victim told the police that on the evening of April 25, 2014, Mr. Dick called her
names, “pushed her on to their bed, straddled her, and punched her in the face between
eight (8) to ten (10) times with closed fists.” (PSI, p.3.) The victim also told the police
that Mr. Dick “encircled her neck with both of his hands . . . and cut off her airway . . . .”
(PSI, p.3.) This version of events has always been disputed by Mr. Dick and does not
represent the offense to which he pled guilty. (See PSI, pp.4-5, 36.)
ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Dick’s Rule 35 motion?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Dick’s Rule 35 Motion
In his opening brief, Mr. Dick argued the district court abused its discretion when
it denied his Rule 35 motion because it did not exercise due caution when it considered,
at sentencing, the circumstances of his arrest on October 26, 2014. (App. Br., p.4.) In
response, the State first argues that Mr. Dick did not present any new information in
support of his Rule 35 motion. (Resp. Br., pp.4-5.) The State is incorrect. The district
court recognized that Mr. Dick presented “new or additional” facts in support of his Rule
35 motion. (R., p.109.)

Specifically, Mr. Dick explained the circumstances that led to

his arrest on October 26, 2014, including the fact that the victim contacted him multiple
times via phone and text message, and broke into Mr. Dick’s house on multiple
occasions, which ultimately led to his contacting the victim on October 26, 2014 to
recover his laptop. (R., pp.78-81.) This information was not presented to the district
court at sentencing and, as such, was new.
With respect to the merits, the State argues that Mr. Dick has failed to establish
an abuse of discretion because the district court “exercised ‘due caution’ in considering
[Mr.] Dick’s pending charges for DUI and violation of a no contact order as ‘only
accusations,’ and did not sentence [Mr.] Dick based solely on the new charges.” (Resp.
Br., p.6 (emphasis added).) The State does not appear to contest that the district court
based Mr. Dick’s sentence, at least to some degree, on his October arrest. This cannot
reasonably be disputed in light of the district court’s own statements at sentencing. The
district court said at sentencing that Mr. Dick’s October arrest is “certainly costing him
dearly because the State’s no longer bound in any way by the plea agreement . . . .”
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(Tr., p.26, Ls.11-12.) The district court later expressed how upset it was when it learned
about the October incident. The district court said:
In this particular case, quite frankly, when I got the reports from Parma,
my first thought was I’m just going to impose ten years fixed. Maybe when
he gets out of the pen in another ten years he’ll get it. It would be well
within my rights to do it, given the facts of this case.
(Tr., p.28, Ls.3-8.)
Mr. Dick requested that the district court reduce his sentence pursuant to Rule 35
because the district court was not aware at sentencing of the circumstances that led to
his arrest on October 26, 2014. The district court denied Mr. Dick’s Rule 35 motion
because it concluded that “the facts alleged by [Mr. Dick] do not justify or provide new
information to the crime to which he pled guilty” and are thus “immaterial to the
sentence imposed.” (R., pp.109-10.) This is plainly untrue. The State would have
recommended that the district court retain jurisdiction but for the fact that Mr. Dick was
arrested on October 26, 2014. (Tr., p.6, L.24 – p.7, L.7.) Because of his October
arrest, the district court imposed a lengthier fixed term on Mr. Dick than even the State
recommended and declined to retain jurisdiction. (R., p.66, 71; Tr., p.28, Ls.17-24.)
The October incident was clearly material to the sentence imposed, and the district
court’s statement to the contrary is erroneous.
Where, as here, a district court sentences a defendant for an offense that is not
before the court, and considers the existence of alleged criminal activity without due
caution, the proper remedy is for this Court to vacate the sentence and remand for
resentencing.

See, e.g., State v. Findeisen, 133 Idaho 228, 229 (Ct. App. 1999)

(vacating and remanding for resentencing where “the district court went beyond [its]
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authority and essentially imposed sentence for offenses other than the one that was
before the court”).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above as well as those in his opening brief, Mr. Dick
respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s order denying his Rule 35
motion and remand to the district court with instruction to retain jurisdiction.
DATED this 8th day of June, 2016.

___________/s/______________
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 8th day of June, 2016, I served a true and
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KENNETH S DICK
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SAMUEL A HOAGLAND
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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__________/s/_______________
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
AWR/eas

6

